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Abstract. Despite the number of tools created to help end-users reduce risky 
security behaviours, users are still falling victim to online attacks.  This paper 
proposes a browser extension utilising affective feedback to provide warnings 
on detection of risky behaviour.  The paper provides an overview of behaviour 
considered to be risky, explaining potential threats users may face online.  Ex-
isting tools developed to reduce risky security behaviours in end-users have 
been compared, discussing the success rate of various methodologies.  Ongoing 
research is described which attempts to educate users regarding the risks and 
consequences of poor security behaviour by providing the appropriate feedback 
on the automatic recognition of risky behaviour.  The paper concludes that a so-
lution utilising a browser extension is a suitable method of monitoring poten-
tially risky security behaviour.  Ultimately, future work seeks to implement an 
affective feedback mechanism within the browser extension with the aim of im-
proving security awareness. 
Keywords: Usable security, end-user security behaviours, affective computing, 
user monitoring techniques, feedback, security awareness. 
1 Introduction 
A lack of awareness surrounding online behaviour can expose users to a number of 
security flaws.  Average users can easily click on malicious links which are purport-
edly secure; a fact highlighted by the number of users who have computers infected 
with viruses and malware [10].  This paper aims to identify potential security issues 
users may face when browsing the web such as phishing attempts and privacy con-
cerns.  Techniques developed to help educate users regarding their security awareness 
have been reviewed, comparing the methods used to engage users, discussing the 
potential flaws in such tools.  Previous research has indicated affective feedback may 
serve as a successful method of educating users about risky security behaviours 
[7][8][9], thus improving system security.  The paper proposes the use of a browser 
extension to monitor users actions and detect risky security behaviour.  Future work 
seeks to utilise affective feedback to improve the security awareness of end-users, 
with a view to improving overall system security. 
 
 
2 Background 
Risky security behaviour exhibited by end-users has the potential to leave devices 
vulnerable to compromise [1].  Security tools are available, such as firewalls and virus 
scanners, which are designed to aid users in defending themselves against potential 
online threats however, these tools cannot stop users engaging in risky behaviour.  
End-users continue to engage in risky behaviour indicating that the behaviour of users 
needs to be modified, allowing them to consider the security implications of their 
actions online.  This section explores the definition of risky security behaviour, the 
role of affective feedback and outlines potential threats users may face when brows-
ing the web.  
 
 
2.1 Risky security behaviour 
What constitutes risky behaviour is not necessarily obvious to all end-users and can 
be difficult to recognise.  There are multiple examples of behaviour which could be 
perceived as risky in the context of a browser-based environment e.g. creating weak 
passwords or sharing passwords with colleagues [2] [4], downloading data from un-
safe websites [5] or interacting with a website containing coding vulnerabilities [6]. 
Several pieces of research have been conducted in an attempt to define and catego-
rise risky security behaviour.  One such attempt was documented in a 2005 paper by 
Stanton et al [2].  Interviews were conducted with IT and security experts, in addition 
to a study involving end-users in the US, across a range of professions.  The findings 
produced a taxonomy consisting of 6 identified risky behaviours:  intentional destruc-
tion, detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance and 
basic hygiene.  In 2012, Padayachee [3] also developed a taxonomy to categorise 
compliant security behaviours whilst investigating if particular users had a predisposi-
tion to adhering to security behaviour.  The results of the research highlighted ele-
ments which may influence security behaviours in users e.g. extrinsic motivation, 
identification, awareness and organisational commitment. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Affective feedback 
Affective feedback is defined as, ”the process of using technology to help people 
achieve and maintain specific internal states” [7] i.e. using signals to alter user behav-
iour.  There are a variety of feedback methods which are considered to be affective.  
Avatars provide affective feedback and have been seen to be beneficial in educational 
environments [7] [8] [9].  Textual information with the use of specific words also has 
the potential to alter a user's state/behaviour e.g. a password may be described as 
"weak" and this can encourage them to create a stronger password [14].  Colour is 
also often utilised, with green or blue used to imply a positive occurrence, with red 
indicating a negative outcome [14]. 
 
 
2.3 Potential threats 
Whilst users are browsing the web, there are a number of security issues they may 
potentially be subjected to.  In addition to breaking the law, should users download 
illegal files such as pirated movies or software, they are also engaging in risky securi-
ty behaviour, placing their system at risk.  The files downloaded may contain viruses 
or malware [5]. 
Interaction with websites featuring coding vulnerabilities is also risky and users are 
generally unaware of such flaws [28].  If an application is poorly constructed, users 
may expose themselves to an attack by simply visiting a site e.g. vulnerability to XSS 
attacks or session hijacking.  Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks are common on the 
web and may occur where users have to insert data into a website e.g. a contact form.  
Attacks related to social engineering are also linked to technology flaws.  Often, users 
divulge too much information about themselves on social networking sites [10] e.g. it 
is possible to extract geolocation data from a specific Twitter account to establish the 
movements of a user.  Such patterns have the potential to highlight the workplace or 
home of a user.  An attacker could target a user, gathering the information shared to 
produce a directed attack against the victim e.g. sending the victim an email contain-
ing a malicious link about a subject they are interested in [6].  Sending a user an email 
of this type is known as a phishing attack (a spear phishing attack when it is targeted 
towards specific users).  The malicious link contained within the email may link to a 
site asking users to enter information such as bank account details.  As such, many 
average-users would fail to identify a phishing email, potentially revealing private 
information [12] [29].  The rise in spear phishing attacks has led the FBI to warn the 
public regarding this issue [31]. 
Perhaps one of the most common risky security behaviours involves the misuse of 
passwords for online accounts which link to personal information.  There can be a 
trade off between the level of security of a password provides and it's usability [4].  
Passwords which are shorter are less secure however, they are easier for users to re-
member and are therefore usable.  Users may also engage in the practice of sharing 
passwords.  When Stanton et al. [2] interviewed 1167 end-users in devising a taxon-
omy of risky behaviours, it was found that 23% of those interviewed shared their 
passwords with colleagues.  27.9% of participants wrote their passwords down. 
These are just a sample of the attacks users may be subjected to whilst browsing 
the web on a daily basis.  User’s attitudes regarding risky security behaviour must be 
modified in a bid to keep them safer online. 
 
 
3 Analysis 
This section explores previous research, providing an overview of methods which 
have been developed in an attempt to keep users safer online.  Solutions created to 
reduce specific types of attack will be discussed, highlighting potential issues these 
tools fail to resolve. 
 
 
 
3.1 Keeping users safe and preventing attacks 
Many users participate in risky security behaviour, particularly when it involves 
passwords, as highlighted by Stanton et al. [2].  A number of attempts have been 
made to understand the problems users face when dealing with passwords, with tools 
developed to aid users.  Furnell et. al [13] conducted a study in 2006, to gain an in-
sight into how end-users deal with passwords.  The survey found that 22% of partici-
pants said they lacked security awareness, with 13% of people admitting they required 
security training.  Participants also found browser security dialogs confusing and in 
some cases, misunderstood the warnings they were provided with.  The majority of 
participants considered themselves as above average in terms of their understanding 
of technology, yet many struggled with basic security.  As result of confusion in end-
users, a number of studies have been conducted in an attempt to improve users securi-
ty awareness in terms of passwords. 
Bicakci et. al [15] explored the use of using graphical passwords built into a 
browser extension, based on the notion that humans are better at memorising images 
than text.  The aim of the software developed was to make passwords more usable, 
decreasing the likelihood of users engaging in risky security behaviour.  Participants 
could select 5 points on an image with a grid overlay to produce a password, which 
was compared against previous research conducted with plain images.  Results from 
the study showed the grid had little effect on the password chosen however, in a sur-
vey of end-users, the grid proved to be more successful than an image without a grid 
in terms of usability when rated using a Likert scale. 
To demonstrate the strength of a chosen password, Ur et. al [14] investigated how 
strength meters placed next to password fields improved the security and usability of 
passwords.  Participants were asked to rate their password security perceptions on a 
Likert scale.  Immediately after creating a password with the aid of a meter, they were 
surveyed regarding their opinion of the tool.  The tool was deemed to be a useful aid 
in password creation with participants noting that use of words such as "weak" en-
couraged them into creating a stronger password.  However, the study was repeated 
the following day and between 77% and 89% (depending on the different groups) 
were able to recall their passwords, which fails to sufficiently test the memorability of 
a password at a much later date.  Additionally, 38% of participants admitted to writ-
ing down their password from the previous day, highlighting that despite the encour-
agement of the password meter, complex passwords are still difficult to remember. 
Much of the research conducted into keeping users safe online, educating them 
about risky security behaviour revolves around phishing attacks.  Recently, a number 
of solutions have been developed to gauge how best to inform users about the dangers 
of phishing attacks, with the hope that education will reduce participation in risky 
security behaviours. 
Dhamija and Tygar [16] produced a method to enable users to distinguish between 
spoofed websites and genuine sites.  A Firefox extension was developed which pro-
vided users with a trusted window in which to enter login details.  A remote server 
generated a unique image which is used to customise the web page the user is visiting, 
whilst the browser detects the image and displays it in the trusted window e.g. as a 
background image on the page.  Content from the server is authenticated via the use 
of the secure Remote Password Protocol.  If the images match, the website is genuine 
and provides a simple way for a user to verify the authenticity of the website.   
Sheng et. al [18] tried a different approach to reducing risky behaviour, gamifying 
the subject of phishing with a tool named Anti-Phishing Phil.  The game involves a 
fish named Phil who has to catch worms, avoiding the worms, on the end of fisher-
men’s hooks (these are the phishing attempts).  The study compared 3 approaches to 
teaching users about phishing: playing the Anti-Phishing Phil game, reading a tutorial 
developed or reading existing online information.  After playing the game, 41% of 
participants viewed the URL of the web page, checking if it was genuine.  The game 
produced some unwanted results in that participants became overly cautious, produc-
ing a number of false-positives during the experimental phase. 
PhishGuru is another training tool designed by Kumaraguru et. al [18] to discour-
age people from revealing information in phishing attacks.  When a user clicks on a 
link in a suspicious email, they are presented with a cartoon message, warning them 
of the dangers of phishing, and how they can avoid becoming a victim.  The cartoon 
proved to be effective: participants retained the information after 28 days.  The tool 
didn't cause participants to become overly cautious and they continued to click on 
links in genuine emails however, a longer study is required. 
Information that allows phishing emails to be targeted towards specific users can 
come from revealing too much information online.  A proposed series of nutrition 
labels for online privacy have been designed in an effort to reduce risky behaviour 
[19].  While it has been shown users don't fully understand privacy policies online, 
the nutrition labels seek to present the information in a format which is easier for 
users to understand.  Labels were designed using a simplified grid design with a series 
of symbols representing how a site utilises data: how it is collected and used, and 
whether data is required (opt-in or opt-out).  Results from a small study found that 
visually, the labels were more interesting to read than a traditional security policy and 
presented an easier way for users to find information. 
Besmer et. al [20] acknowledged that various applications may place users at risk 
by revealing personal information.  A tool was developed and tested on Facebook to 
present a simpler way of informing the user about who could view their information.  
A prototype user interface highlighted the information the site required, optional in-
formation, the profile data the user had provided and the percentage of the users 
friends who could see the information entered.  The study showed that those who 
were already interested in protecting their information found the interface useful in 
viewing how applications handled the data. 
In addition to security tools which have been developed to target privacy issues on 
social networking sites, studies have also focussed on more general warning tools 
when the user is browsing the web.  A Firefox extension developed by Maurer [21] 
attempts to provide alert dialogs when users are entering sensitive data such as credit 
card information.  The extension seeks to raise security awareness, providing large 
JavaScript dialogs to warn users, noting that the use of certain colours made the user 
feel more secure.  
 
 
 
3.2 Issues with traditional security tools and advice 
Some of the tools discussed in section 3.1 provided unwanted results, in particular, 
studies found that, users became overly cautious when browsing the web and pro-
duced a number of false positive results when detecting phishing attacks [18].  Anoth-
er study highlighted that although the tool developed for submitting private infor-
mation online performed well in experiments, it was difficult to encourage users to 
make use of it.  Instead, several participants continued to use web forms which they 
were more familiar with [17].   
Many of the tools created focus on one specific area where users are vulnerable 
e.g. they educate people about privacy, passwords or phishing attempts.  Despite the 
number of tools created and designed to help protect users online, users continue to 
engage in risky security behaviour, placing their information and devices at risk.  The 
tools developed span a number of years, indicating that the issue of risky security 
behaviour has yet to be resolved. 
 
 
 
  
4 Methodology 
The research outlined in this section proposes the use of a browser extension to auto-
matically detect risky security behaviour. Previous research has indicated affective 
feedback may serve as a successful method of educating users about risky security 
behaviours [7] [8] [9].  Future work seeks to explore the possibility of utilising an 
affective feedback mechanism in enhancing security risk awareness on detection of 
risky behaviour within the browser. 
 
 
4.1 Proposed system overview 
The research proposed seeks to develop a software prototype, in the form of a Firefox 
browser extension which monitors user behaviour.  The prototype will contain feed-
back agents, several of which will utilise affective feedback techniques. Should the 
user engage in potentially risky security behaviour whilst browsing e.g. entering a 
password or credit card number into a form, an affective feedback mechanism will 
trigger, warning users regarding the dangers of their actions.  Feedback mechanisms 
have been explored in previous research and will include colour-based feedback (e.g. 
green indicating good behaviour), text-based feedback using specific terms and ava-
tars using subtle cues within the browser window [30].  Experiments using these 
agents will investigate a) if security risk awareness improves in end-users and b) if 
overall system security improves through the use of affective feedback (Figure 1).  
The success of the software will be gauged via a series of end-user experiments fol-
lowed by a questionnaire utilising a Likert scale. 
  
 
 
Fig. 1. - Overview of system architecture 
 
 
 
4.2 Technical details 
Following a comparison between XUL-based Firefox extensions (XML User Inter-
face Language) and those created by Mozilla's Add-on SDK, a prototype solution was 
constructed using a XUL-based extension.  This method allows for extensive custom-
isation of the user interface, which a tool of this type requires and additional function-
ality can be gained via the links to the XPCOM (cross platform component object 
model) [25].  When developing Firefox extensions to capture user behaviour and pro-
vide feedback to users, a number of files are required.  Extensions follow the same 
basic structure, with several files which must be included (Figure 2).  In terms of 
modifying an extension in an attempt to monitor user behaviour and provide cues to 
modify the behaviour, particular files are very important. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Typical structure of a Firefox browser extension 
 
 
The Browser.xul file within the content folder contains a number of links to other 
required files and is essentially the foundation for the whole extension.  This file has 
the ability to link to JavaScript files, including the jQuery library, should it need to be 
embedded in an extension.  The file also allows additional XUL constructs to be add-
ed, allowing the menus and toolbars within Firefox to be modified e.g. adding a link 
into a menu to allow the user to run an extension. 
Another file, which can be modified extensively, is the JavaScript file within the 
content folder. It can call a number of functions, including referencing the jQuery 
library and can make use of the Mozilla framework.  The file can manipulate the 
DOM (document object model) of the website displayed in the browser e.g. attach 
event listeners to all links on a page or modify anchor tags.  Additionally, the file can 
utilise AJAX, passing data back and forth between a web server. 
To provide a full example of how a Firefox extension may be developed to monitor 
user behaviour and provide appropriate feedback, details of the Link Detector exten-
sion are outlined (Figure 3).  The Link Detector extension is designed to warn users 
about malicious links. When the user starts the Firefox extension, the browser.xul file 
makes a call to the JavaScript file to run the initial function.  The DOM is then ma-
nipulated, using JavaScript to add event listeners to all links on a given website.  If a 
user approaches a link with the cursor, an event is triggered.  JavaScript passes the 
link value to a PHP script via AJAX, and is checked against a list of known malicious 
links [26].  The AJAX request then returns a value indicating if the link is known to 
be malicious.  If the link is flagged as being potentially dangerous, the JavaScript file 
then manipulates the DOM, highlighting the malicious link in red. This is repeated for 
each link a user approaches. 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 3. Overview of the Link Detector extension 
 
 
 
 
5 Discussion 
A key challenge involved in the development of a Firefox extension which monitors 
user behaviour, was the consideration of how to capture user behaviour within the 
confines of a web-browser. The prototype in development seeks to target average 
users i.e. those who may use IT at work or home to access the Internet but lack a 
computing-based background. As such, these users may not have a clear understand-
ing of security issues, and implications.  Previous studies have investigated the use of 
multimodal approaches to capture user behaviour, using a combination of eye move-
ments [23] and video footage of test subjects [24], in addition to task-based analysis. 
Average computer users may only have a simple PC, therefore the final tool created 
should not require any additional hardware such as cameras to record data.  In this 
respect, monitoring user behaviour, within the restrictions of the browser environment 
is a major developmental challenge. 
Section 4.2 demonstrated that JavaScript contains the necessary low-level event-
driven functionality to detect user interaction on a webpage, and can therefore be used 
to monitor security behaviour. Section 3.1 highlighted that a number of successful 
tools utilised browser extensions, and therefore, a similar approach has been utilised.  
It became apparent that implementing a JavaScript system within a Firefox extension 
might be a potential solution. Using JavaScript to access the DOM of the webpage 
displayed in the browser window meant it was possible to run the script against any 
website, rather than one coded specifically for the research.  Though Firefox security 
extensions are widely implemented, currently available solutions are yet to explore 
the impact of affective feedback, particularly when educating users about security 
awareness. 
Affective feedback has been used to educate users in the past and as such, may be a 
suitable method when educating users regarding security awareness.  An empirical 
review conducted by Dehn and Van Mulken [27] considered ways in which animated 
agents interacted with users, providing a comparison between the role of avatars and 
textual information in human-computer interaction.  Though it was hypothesised that 
users gained more direct feedback from textual information, avatars provided more 
subtle cues through specific gestures. Robison et al. [8] successfully utilised avatars in 
an intelligent tutoring system, helping students learn about microbiology.  This indi-
cates that potentially, affective feedback may show similar results when aiding users 
in considering their security behaviour [7]. 
Research is currently in the early stages and as such, a series of preliminary Firefox 
extensions have been developed to test the methodology, concentrating on capturing 
user behaviour.  Affective feedback agents will be added at a later date. The Link 
Detector is an extension designed to warn users about malicious links, and has been 
outlined in detail in section 4.2.  An additional extension was developed to determine 
what a user is typing on a given website.  Utilising jQuery, keystrokes are written to a 
log file on a server, along with a timestamp.  Essentially, the extension passes key-
press information to a PHP file via AJAX.  The PHP script separates the contents of 
the keypress array and attaches an appropriate timestamp.  
A series of tests using the keypress extension were run on a desktop machine, pro-
ducing some interesting results.  The extension successfully logged keystroke infor-
mation when the word “hello” was typed and if a website included a form with an 
input password field, the extension continued to log the information. Sample websites 
could be developed for users during the testing phase, mitigating the need to reveal 
real password information. Eventually, the keypress extension will detect the name of 
the form field a user is entering information into. If the form field is requesting sensi-
tive information such as a password, an affective agent will be triggered to warn users 
about the potential dangers of risky security behaviour. 
 
 
6 Conclusion and future work 
Despite the number of tools proposed to help end-users reduce risky security behav-
iours, it is apparent that users are still falling victim to online attacks.  Various tools 
created focus on educating and warning users regarding one specific type of threat 
e.g. phishing attacks.  A different approach, integrating warnings concerning multiple 
types of threats to modify user behaviour may be a potential solution.  Specifically, 
these warnings would utilise affective feedback, with previous research indicating that 
this type of feedback may be suitable in an educational context. 
Future work seeks to continue the development of Firefox extensions which moni-
tor and detect risky security behaviour, and provide affective feedback to discourage 
such behaviour.  The monitoring solution is to be expanded, detecting the information 
users are revealing online, with a view to preventing users from disclosing sensitive 
information.  Feedback agents will be created, featuring differing affective feedback 
techniques such as text-based feedback using specific terms, colour-based feedback 
and avatars using subtle cues and gestures.  Ultimately, the prototype software devel-
oped will seek to investigate if security-risk awareness in end-users improves through 
the use of affective feedback, with the potential to also improve overall system securi-
ty. 
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